On April 6, 2020, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (“NJDEP”) proposed substantial changes to the Remediation Standards at N.J.A.C. 7:26D, promulgated under the Brownfield and Contaminated Site Remediation Act, N.J.S.A. 58:10B-1 et seq. (“Brownfield Act”). The proposal seeks to amend the existing Remediation Standards in a number of ways, many of which have potential for significant impacts on ongoing and future remediation in the state. The following is a brief discussion of some, but not all, of the changes that NJDEP proposes.

To begin with, NJDEP’s proposed amendments would update the default minimum remediation standards for various media and exposure pathways. For ground water and surface water, the existing Ground Water Quality Standards and Surface Water Quality Standards remain in effect. However, the proposed rule would mark a sea change in how NJDEP conceptualizes soil remediation standards. Currently, the Remediation Standards provide for combined health-based standards for ingestion-dermal and inhalation pathways. Under the proposed rules, the Remediation Standards would, instead, provide distinct health-based standards for each pathway, separating the ingestion-dermal standard from the inhalation standard. While not part of the proposed rulemaking, NJDEP is amending its existing technical guidance documents to reflect these changes. We will be on the lookout for those documents as they come available.

Importantly, the proposed amendments would also include impact to ground water soil remediation standards. Under the current iteration of the rules, NJDEP establishes such standards on a case-by-base basis. The proposed rulemaking would create codified remediation standards “for soil and soil leachate for the migration to ground water pathway, based upon migration of contaminants to ground water and subsequent human ingestion of ground water.” Also of significance is NJDEP’s proposed remediation standard for indoor air. Currently, the rules do not provide standards for remediating indoor air based on vapor intrusion.

Note that under the Brownfield Act, NJDEP may require ongoing remediations with an approved remedial action work plan (“RAWP”) to comply with newly promulgated standards where those standards are more stringent than the standards under which the RAWP was approved. As such, individuals, property owners, and developers with ongoing remediation would benefit from monitoring the progress of these proposed amendments, as they have the potential for significant impacts, even for sites that are well underway.

Since publishing notice of the proposed rule, NJDEP has extended the public comment deadline from June 5, 2020 to August 5, 2020, based on the needs of the State’s COVID-19 response. 

The text of NJDEP’s proposed alterations to the Remediation Standards can be found here.

On May 2, 2020 Governor Murphy signed Executive Order No. 136 tolling several timeframes administered by DEP, as well as extending certain filing deadlines.

Beginning on March 9, 2020, all timeframes governing public notice, review, or final action on applications for, or renewals of permits, registrations, plans, petitions, licenses, rates, and other approvals under the following statutes administered by DEP are tolled beginning on March 9, 2020:

  • N.J.S.A. 13:1D-32 (Construction Permits),
  • N.J.S.A. 13:19-8 (Coastal Area Facility Review Act Permits),
  • N.J.S.A. 48:3-7 (Utility Property Transactions), and
  • N.J.S.A. 58:16A-67 (Stream Cleaning Permit).

The timeframes are tolled by each day during the Public Health Emergency declared by Executive Order No. 103 (2020), and no request submitted pursuant to any of these statutes shall be deemed complete or approved for failure to act within the timeframes prescribed by the four statutory provisions listed above.

For what is commonly referred to as the “Dirty Dirt Law”, timeframes are extended by the number of days of the Public Health Emergency declared in Executive Order No. 103 (2020) plus an additional 60 days for:

  • businesses to submit a registration form to DEP to engage in soil and fill recycling services pursuant to N.J.S.A. 13:1E-127.1;
  • DEP to review and issue such registration;
  • the deadline after which a business may not engage in soil and fill recycling services without a valid registration; and,
  • a registrant to submit an administratively complete license application to the Attorney General.

The deadline for the governing body of each municipality to submit its yearly recycling tonnage report to DEP by July 1, 2020, under N.J.S.A. 13:1E-99.16.e (Municipal Recycling System), is extended by 60 days.

The deadline for recyclers, manufacturers, collection locations and local government units who collect electronic devices to submit their semiannual report to DEP by August 1, 2020, as required by N.J.S.A. 13:1E-99.105c, is extended by 60 days.

For additional information pertaining to the coronavirus outbreak, please visit CSG’s COVID-19 Resource Center.

On April 16, 2020, the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court, the state’s intermediate appellate court, published three precedential opinions concerning the state’s condemnation of ocean-front property for access and use by the public.  New Jersey, from Sandy Hook to Cape May, has 130 miles of beaches on the Atlantic Ocean.  “Goin’ down the shore” is a firmly held tradition for New Jersey residents and visitors alike.  In 2018, around 48 million people visited the Jersey Shore counties and many of them enjoyed the beaches.  Public access and use of those beaches have occasioned public debate and court cases.  These three cases continue the line of decisions approving actions taken to create and protect such access and use.

State v. 1 Howe Street Bay Head, LLC involved a privately owned and maintained revetment (rocks covered with sand and vegetation) between homes and the ocean to protect against coastal storm flooding.  The state, with the financial assistance of the United States, intended to build a 14-mile dune and berm system to be replenished periodically after the beaches naturally eroded.   In Bay Head, this system was to be built between the revetment and the ocean. The state contended, in the trial below, that its proposed system would provide the best protection against flooding, in part because, unlike the revetment, it would also protect the beach itself.  The project required the condemnation of private property for the project as well as public access and use.  The 1 Howe Street Bay Head LLC asserted a number of defenses that were rejected by the court below and the Appellate Division.  It ruled that the state has the power to condemn easements for storm-protection purposes and for public access to public waters (which, under New Jersey law, includes the ocean) and the use of those waters.

In State v. 10.041 Acres of Land in the Borough of Point Pleasant Beach, the 14-mile dune and berm system crossed a commercial public beach property that provided parking and visitor services to the public wishing beach and ocean access.  The state wanted an easement over much of the commercial beach property, but not all.  The state included in the easement language that gave the Department of Environmental Protection, without conditions, the right to operate the beaches subject to the easement.  The appellant objected claiming it was illegal.  The trial court below and the Appellate Division authorized the State’s language.

An appeal from a denial by the court below for a requested plenary hearing (in effect, a trial with witnesses) was decided in New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection v. Midway Beach Condominium Association, Inc.  This case also involved a privately maintained preexisting storm protection system.  The condominium association contended before the trial court that the 14-mile dune and berm system was unnecessary at its property because of the preexisting system.  It requested a plenary hearing so that the court, after hearing and evaluating testimony, would rule on the issue.  The court below ruled that there was no triable issue of fact because there was no dispute as to the facts.  The state submitted a certification demonstrating the preexisting system was inadequate and the condominium association failed to dispute it.  The Appellate Division affirmed the ruling of the court below.  It also rejected an argument that, because each condominium owner had rights to access to beachfront property, each of them had to be included in the condemnation process.  The court referenced a statute that specifically provides that that condominium owners should participate through their condominium association.

Certainly, these cases will not be the last ones to address challenges to easements for public beach access and use.  But the defenses potentially available to challengers is shrinking.

As we are all dealing with the impact of the ongoing COVID pandemic, it is important to remember that this year marks the 50th anniversary of the start of the Environmental Decade, which began in 1970.  That year, the first Earth Day occurred and both the United States Environmental Protection Agency and the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection were created.  The decade commenced with the enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. (“NEPA”).  This seminal legislation is the basis by which all federal agencies must consider the environmental impacts of planned federal actions by preparing an environmental assessment or, if there are potential significant impacts, an environmental impact statement.  Agencies are required to mitigate (or have applicants for approvals mitigate) to offset environmental impacts from the federal actions.

By signing NEPA at the start of the decade, President Nixon set the tone for a renewed focus on environmental issues.  In the years that followed, other major federal environmental legislation was enacted.  In 1970, the Clean Air Act was adopted establishing national air quality standards and requiring states to adopt implementation plans to achieve compliance.  This was further amended and expanded in 1977.  In 1972, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act was substantially amended, rewritten and expanded upon. The law was further broadened by the Clean Water Act of 1977.  These laws led to the regulation of discharges to surface water and the protection of wetlands among other things.  In 1976, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act was adopted, creating comprehensive regulation of hazardous waste.  In 1980, the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act was signed into law establishing the federal Superfund cleanup program.  Similar state laws were enacted in New Jersey and other states during this time period.  Since then, these laws have been continually updated and refined as new environmental risks have been identified and addressed.

As a teenager in the 1970s, I enjoyed the outdoors and, as a result of the first Earth Day, became interested in environmental protection.  After obtaining a science degree and attending law school, I have been fortunate to develop an environmental legal practice where I have witnessed the implementation of these laws and the positive impact they have had on the environment.  While things are certainly much improved from where they were in 1970, much remains to be done and new challenges arise every day.

NEPA manifested a general understanding that the unintended consequences of human activity could negatively affect the environment and needed to be considered.  The other statutes focused on specific means of addressing and reducing negative impacts on the environment, primarily by controlling large sources of pollution or requiring clean up of past pollution.   

Today, 50 years later, changes are being proposed to the NEPA process which some believe will undermine its fundamental principles.  The changes include limiting the scope of review and putting time limits on the process, among others. The regulation of large sources of pollution has been effective to a degree, but both air quality and fishable/swimmable water goals have not been achieved and there are ongoing discussions about reducing the scope of some of the pertinent regulations.  Cleanups have progressed, but many sites remain.  New challenges have been recognized such as the impacts of global warming and the determination that certain chemicals which have not been regulated to date pose potential health risks. 

Anyone concerned with the environment and all environmental lawyers need to be involved in addressing the issues facing us in 2020.  The spirit and principles that led to the enactment of NEPA need to be preserved and further advanced.  Policymakers need to look at the most pressing environmental risks and prioritize addressing those first.  The next generation of environmental laws need to move beyond point source pollution regulation to forcing changes in behavior at all levels that will protect the environment and finally achieve the goals of the legislation from the 1970s while meeting the challenges of this century.  This process has begun through the enactment of laws pushing clean energy as the preferred (or only) alternative.  But more is needed.  One of the lessons learned from the COVID crisis is that reduction in vehicle miles travelled does lead to immediate clean air benefits.  Let’s use this  lesson to make the real changes we need  to achieve the goals established 50 years ago.

Let’s all start by changing our own behavior and making the 2020s the new 1970s when it comes to furtherance of environmental protection. 

In celebration of Earth Day 2020, CSG employees participated in EarthShare’s Responsible Tomorrows Challenge. For more information, please visit EarthShare’s website.

In a recent decision, the Appellate Division clarified DEP’s ability to recover damages for environmental contamination under common law, holding that (1) the Spill Act does not subsume common law claims, (2) strict liability may apply to oil refining and storage operations, (3) the Public Trust Doctrine does not confer sufficient property rights to support trespass claims, and (4) public nuisance claims made by public entities may result in abatement costs. See DEP v. Hess Corp., Dkt. A-2893-18T2 (App. Div. Apr. 7, 2020).

The case involves a 210-acre oil refinery and storage facility in Woodbridge. Hess Corp. owned and operated the facility from 1958 until 2013 when it was acquired by the current owner, Buckeye Partners. DEP alleged that Hess discharged over eight million gallons of crude oil and other hazardous substances at the property, resulting in contamination of surface water, ground water and soils. Hess and Buckeye moved to dismiss DEP’s common law claims of strict liability, trespass and public nuisance.

Common Law Claims. As an initial matter, the Appellate Division held that Spill Act claims do not subsume common law claims. The Spill Act specifically contemplates common law claims co-existing with Spill Act claims.

Strict liability. The Court found that Hess’s alleged oil refinery and storage operations on a 210-acre property adjacent to environmentally sensitive areas, including the Arthur Kill, created an “abnormally dangerous condition for which strict liability may be imposed.” In so doing, the Court distinguished a Law Division case finding that a gas station was not abnormally dangerous, explaining that the refinery complex simply is not comparable to a gas station. Strict liability claims against Buckeye were dismissed because DEP did not allege that Buckeye used or permitted a use of the land that created the abnormally dangerous condition.

Trespass. The Court dismissed DEP’s trespass claims. DEP’s property interest in contaminated ground and surface water arises from the Public Trust Doctrine (i.e., property interests are held in trust by the State on behalf of the people). Trespass claims require invasion to land in the exclusive possession of the plaintiff. The trespass claims were dismissed because the Public Trust Doctrine does not convey exclusive possession.

Public Nuisance. The Court dismissed DEP’s public nuisance damages claim because public entities cannot seek monetary relief for public nuisance. However, the Court explained that DEP may seek injunctive relief ordering abatement of the nuisance, which may necessarily require the defendant to bear the costs of such abatement.

This decision reaffirms many of the well-established principles underlying DEP cost-recovery actions. Despite being non-precedential, it also clarifies the scope of potential common law liability for defendants.

David J. Mairo was featured on Envision Environmental, Inc.’s The Business of Environment podcast discussing how to strike an appropriate balance between the technical and legal sides of environmental issues such as site remediation, land use, real estate transactions and regulatory compliance to achieve results clients, regulators and other stakeholders can agree on. Throughout the episode, Dave also touches upon best practices when managing ever-changing environmental regulations, when to call an environmental attorney, Brownfield redevelopment and considerations to keep in mind when acquiring a property.

To listen to the podcast, please visit Envision Environmental’s website.

On March 18, 2020, the Appellate Division affirmed the Department of Environmental Protection’s November 9, 2017 decision to renew the Tier A municipal separate storm sewer system (MS4) general permit. (Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. NJDEP, Dkt. A-1821-17T3.) Stormwater discharges must be permitted by DEP. General permits streamline the permitting process by avoiding the time and expense associated with issuing individual permits to each municipality. The general permit at issue in this case authorizes the discharge of stormwater from MS4s owned or operated by 457 urban or coastal municipalities throughout New Jersey.

The decision sets forth in detail the permitting history of MS4 discharges since 1987, and explains that the current permit has been strengthened from the prior iteration based on EPA comments. The decision also highlights the challenges associated with regulating stormwater. By way of example, the permit requires Tier A municipalities to adopt and enforce various community-wide ordinances, including pet waste ordinances, wildlife-feeding ordinances, and litter control ordinances, and to maintain a log of related enforcement actions in their stormwater pollution prevention plan so that the DEP can verify compliance. In affirming the permit decision, the Court also acknowledged the limited deference afforded to agencies interpreting regulations within their enforcement responsibilities, and emphasized the need for site specific, flexible standards.

Regarding the specific arguments raised on appeal, the permit challengers argued that the general permit was unlawful because it failed to include effluent monitoring that measures mass and volume of pollutants. Citing to federal regulations, the Appellate Division found no such monitoring was required and that the Best Management Practices (BMPs) and monitoring mandated by the general permit sufficed. The challengers also argued, among other things, that the permit failed to include effluent limits consistent with wasteload allocations previously adopted by DEP. The Appellate Division found that the “overarching federal law for MS4s … is broad and flexible. It does not require the DEP to implement numeric effluent limitations; BMPs are appropriate.” Finally, the decision also explained that DEP conducts a wide array of ambient water quality monitoring and that if water quality standards are not met, the DEP may review a municipality’s permit and make revisions.

While we are all dealing with the challenges presented by coronavirus, it is important that environmental compliance not be forgotten. Both the United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) and the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) have issued guidance.

USEPA has expedited approval of certain sanitizing products and has updated its list of approved sanitizers.  USEPA has also provided assurances regarding drinking water and water treatment.

NJDEP has issued guidance for owners/operators of wastewater treatment or pretreatment systems advising that contingency plans be updated and reminding regulated entities that reporting and compliance obligations remain in effect.

At this time, regulatory deadlines have not been extended and obligations remain in effect. If for any reason, the COVID-19 issues create an environmental compliance concern, it is important that the regulated entity communicate promptly with the agencies. For any potential significant non-compliance, the NJDEP hotline should be called 1-877-WARN DEP. In other circumstances NJDEP, or as applicable USEPA or local agencies, should be contacted. Failure to contact the agencies may vitiate the ability to assert affirmative defenses to non-compliance under environmental laws or the ability to obtain extensions of applicable deadlines.

For additional information pertaining to the coronavirus outbreak, please visit CSG’s COVID-19 Resource Center.

Today, the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities (“NJBPU”) held an emergency meeting via conference call to consider a single emergency order responding to the COVID-19 pandemic. During today’s meeting, the NJBPU issued an order, effective today, mandating the following:

  • All public utilities and entities regulated by the NJBPU shall immediately cease any in-home or business visits unless there is an immediate risk to health and safety and the residents.
  • Any door-to-door activity by third party suppliers or other sales persons selling of energy or energy related products (for example: residential solar, community solar, or energy efficiency offerings) are to be suspended immediately.
  • Broadband internet providers may continue to connect new customers or repair existing service for homes with school age children, those who need internet access to meet job requirements, or other priority customers, as defined by each company, provided that such visits should only be done as a last resort after utilizing hotspots, self-install kits, and like measures to minimize in-home visits.

Although not in the order, NJBPU President Fiordoliso mentioned lack of water service and natural gas leaks as examples of emergent situations involving health and safety risks.

In addition, as an administrative matter, the NJBPU waived any requirements that entities file paper documents with NJBPU or the Division of Rate Counsel, and ordered all submissions of any kind with NJBPU or Rate Counsel be submitted electronically to the Board Secretary or to Rate Counsel. This includes, but is not limited to, those entities participating in the e-filing project, as well as the requirements of N.J.A.C. 14:1 et seq. and N.J.A.C. 13:17.1 et seq. Parties filing documents electronically with the Board Secretary may send them to board.secretary@bpu.nj.gov, and electronically to the rest of the particular matter’s service list. A document will be considered filed on the party receives an electronic confirmation of the filing from the Office of the Board Secretary or Office of Case Management.

NJBPU also ordered that it will construe its filing requirement liberally to minimize the amount of non-electronic filing of any documents and waive the prohibition on the submission of an electronic document from being entered into the record of a formal proceeding. Finally, NJBPU suspended submission of fees due with an original filing as set forth in N.J.S.A. 48:2-56 until further notice. The order is clear that suspended filing fees will be due at a future date to be determined by NJBPU.

It is expected that future NJBPU agenda meetings, to the extent not cancelled, will continue via conference call.

For additional information pertaining to the coronavirus outbreak, please visit CSG’s COVID-19 Resource Center.

An unpublished Superior Court Appellate Division opinion (89 Water Street Associates, LLC v. Reilly, Docket No. A-3366-17T1, October 1, 2019), despite being non-precedential, will be instructive to lawyers handling commercial real estate transactions, land use issues, or environmental litigation arising from environmentally contaminated sites.  The opinion reversed the trial court’s order interpreting environmental terms in a contract for the sale of a parcel of land.  It required the buyer to obtain a Response Action Outcome (RAO) from a Licensed Site Remediation Professional (LSRP), in part because the cost of obtaining the RAO exceeded the parties’ expectations as, in the court’s view, evidenced by extrinsic documents.  The appellate court found that the trial court erred in shifting that burden from the sellers to the buyer.  The appellate court reviewed the contractual terms and surrounding circumstances to conclude that by its terms, the contract imposed the obligation to secure an RAO on the sellers irrespective of the cost and time burdens of doing so.

On its face, the Appellate Division’s opinion appears a straight-forward application of long-established contract-interpretation principles, adhering to the age-old adage that a court will not make a better deal for a party than the party made for itself.  Nevertheless, there are lessons to be gleaned from the court’s analysis.

Sale Agreement

The matter involved a contract for the sale of industrial land in New Jersey.  Defendants (Sellers) acquired the land in the 1980s.  At the time of acquisition, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) issued a No Further Action Letter (NFA) to the Sellers pursuant to the Industrial Site Recovery Act (ISRA).  Sellers then leased the property to National Refrigerants, Inc. (Tenant), in which one of the Sellers was the sole shareholder.  In October 2004, plaintiff (Buyer) and Sellers entered into a contract for the sale of the property.  The sale price was $475,000.  The contract provided for a closing on August 15, 2005 if all conditions to closing were met, otherwise the closing could be extended as far as February 15, 2006.

Section 18 of the contract provided several terms that were central to the dispute.

  • Section 18(a) provided that the parties acknowledged that there was a pre-existing environmental condition at the property.
  • Section 18(b) memorialized the parties’ acknowledgment that ISRA applied to the transaction and that Sellers had the obligation to “receive[] from the Industrial Site Evaluation Element [(ISEE)] or its successor . . . a Clearance Document by the Closing Date.” (alterations in original).  A Clearance Document was defined as “‘(i) a non-applicability letter; (ii) a de minimis quantity exemption; (iii) an unconditional approval of [Sellers’] negative declaration from the’ ISEE or its successor; ‘or (iv) some other document from the [NJ]DEP indication that no further action is required with respect to any environmental remediation of conditions on the Property.’”  (alterations in original).
  • Section 18(c) provided a right for Buyer to terminate the contract in the event Sellers failed to obtain a Clearance Document by the closing date, except to the extent that Section 18(d) provided that so long as Sellers exercised good faith efforts to obtain such a document, no party could void the contract.

Trial Court Findings

From 2005 through 2010, the Tenant – not the Sellers – attempted to obtain a Clearance Document from DEP.  Tenant was obligated under its lease to perform and finance the remedial action.  In December 2012, Sellers notified Buyer of their intent to void the contract and return Buyer’s deposit, noting that neither party had defaulted.  Buyer responded that it wished to proceed under the contract.  Buyer thereafter filed suit for declaratory judgment that the contract had not been voided.

Subsequent to a bench trial, the trial court found that the contract had not been voided.  According to the trial court, the parties did not expect that obtaining a Clearance Document would require substantial cost or effort, and they viewed it as an administrative formality in light of the prior NFA.  Nevertheless, Sellers’ 2012 attempt to void the contract was not effective, as once the specified closing dates passed, good faith efforts on part of Sellers to obtain the Clearance Document tolled all parties’ ability to void the contract.  With the enactment of the Site Remediation Reform Act (SRRA), which in most cases replaced the DEP’s issuance of an NFA with a Response Action Outcome (RAO) issued by a Licensed Site Remediation Professional (LSRP), the court found the Sellers would not be able to fulfill the agreement, because an RAO is not a Clearance Document as that term was defined in the contract.

Importantly, the court thereafter effectively shifted the burden to the Buyer to obtain the Clearance Document or to void the contract of sale.  The court relied on Dixon Venture v. Joseph Dixon Crucible Co., 122 N.J. 228 (1991) and Feighner v. Sauter, 259 N.J. Super. 583 (1992), to determine that because the large expense of obtaining the Clearance Document was not contemplated by the parties disproportionate to the sale price, Buyer’s equitable ownership of the property subsequent to the execution of the contract permitted the court to place that cost burden on Buyer.  That said, because, according to the court, the enactment of SRRA made it impossible for Sellers to continue to exercise good faith efforts to obtain a Clearance Document, Buyer could elect instead to cancel the transaction.  The court conditioned the newly imposed cost burden on a commensurate adjustment in sale price if Buyer chose to close the sale instead of voiding the contract.

Appellate Division Holding

The Appellate Division reversed and remanded the matter.  Analyzing the language of the contract, the court found that Section 18(b) plainly contemplates SRRA, as it acknowledges the applicability of ISRA and any amending or successor legislation or regulations.  Moreover, the contract’s definition of Clearance Document, which includes “some other document from the [NJ]DEP indicating that no further action is required,” is broad enough to encompass an RAO.  The appellate court noted that an RAO serves a similar purpose to the NFA, even though an RAO is prepared by an LSRP and not DEP.  Thus, the court’s conclusion that Sellers could no longer work in good faith to secure a Clearance Document was in error.

Moreover, the contract did not contain any limitation on the costs of obtaining such a document.  The court noted that had the parties wished to impose any such limitation, they would have done so by express terms, as they had elsewhere in the contract.  Taking it a step further, the appellate panel noted that it would be “an abuse of the corporate form” to permit Sellers to elude its obligations under the contract because of cleanup costs incurred by its Tenant which costs were imposed by a separate contract, the lease.

Finally, the court distinguished Dixon and Feighner.  According to the panel, both of those cases involved contracts that did not contemplate the applicability of remediation statutes and regulations and, accordingly, did not contemplate the allocation of liabilities for remediation.  By contrast, the parties here clearly contemplated those liabilities.  The contract specifically acknowledged the environmental conditions present at the property and delineated responsibility for acquiring a Clearance Document to Sellers.  Under those circumstances, the contract reflected an understanding between the parties that Sellers assumed all of the economic risks of bringing the property within applicable remediation standards, and the contract, according to the Appellate Division, should be enforced as such.

Because the court found that the 2012 revocation was ineffective and that the Buyer was entitled to declaratory judgment stating as such, the court remanded the matter and ordered that Buyer be awarded attorney’s fees.

Takeaways

This case affirms the proposition that an RAO issued by an LSRP is contractually the equivalent to an NFA formerly issued by DEP. For attorneys whose practice involves the transfer of contaminated land or litigation involving contaminated land, this case illustrates that well-drafted contracts can protect both parties by including language expressly providing for subsequent changes in law, just as the contract in this case did.  Furthermore, parties can protect their intentions by allocating risks in their contracts by, for example, capping remediation obligations in terms of time (duration in years) and money (future remediation costs), which the parties in this case failed to do, which proved fatal to Sellers’ attempt to cancel the contract here. Indeed, the Appellate Division’s holding on that issue reaffirms the traditional notion that courts will not read terms into contracts in order to craft a better deal for parties than the parties crafted for themselves.  Finally, the case demonstrates the Court’s deference to the corporate form in not allowing the Sellers to elude their contract obligations where the cleanup was being performed by Tenant rather than the Sellers.